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SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLANS: SAYING NO TO
INADEQUATE TENDER OFFERS
INTRODUCTION
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,' the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld the share purchase rights plan ("rights plan" or "poison
pill") as a legitimate defensive mechanism "in the arsenal of corporate
takeover weaponry." 2 Although Moran settled the controversy in Dela-
ware3 surrounding the poison pill's legality,4 the recent increase in take-
over activity has rekindled the poison pill debate.5 The issue now, how-
ever, is whether and under what circumstances a board of directors has a
duty to redeem a poison pill6 during a takeover attempt.7
1. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
2. Id. at 1348.
3. See id. at 1357. The law of the state of incorporation governs the board's defen-
sive actions during a takeover contest. See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215
(Del. 1987); cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) (state
has authority to regulate the affairs of domestic corporations). Delaware law applies in
most of the takeover cases because most corporations are incorporated in Delaware. See
Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709, 720-25
(1987). Moreover, because Delaware offers a sophisticated court and a large body of case
law its decisions are often followed by other courts. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of
America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Indiana takes its cues...
from the [more experienced] Delaware courts"), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69
(1987). However, recent unfavorable decisions involving the poison pill have caused the
creator of the poison pill, Martin Lipton, to suggest that clients consider incorporating
outside of Delaware. See Cohen, Lipton Tells Clients That Delaware May Not Be a Place
to Incorporate, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1988, at B7, col. 1.
4. Subsequently, other courts also approved of the poison pill. See, e.g., Dynamics
Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Ill.) (applying Indiana law),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986); Harvard Indus. v. Tyson,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,064 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25,
1986) (applying Michigan law); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130
(D. Nev. 1985) (applying Nevada law). Some courts have invalidated rights plans with
flip-in provisions on the ground that they discriminate among shares of the same class.
See Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 480 (D.N.J. 1985); Bank
of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 536 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). Flip-in
provisions allow target shareholders, other than the bidder, to purchase the target's
shares at half price once the provision is triggered. See infra notes 37-39 and accompany-
ing text. Other courts have upheld the flip-in provision as discriminating only against
shareholders based on the number of shares they own. See Dynamics Corp. of America
v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 718 (7th Cir. 1986); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652
F. Supp. 829, 847-48 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th
Cir. 1987); Harvard Indus., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,064, at 95,924; see also Note,
Shareholder Rights Plans: Shields or Gavels?, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 173, 192-99 (1989) (dis-
cussing the validity of poison pills under state law).
5. See Labaton, The "Poison Pill" Takes a Beating, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1988, at
D2, col. I. Indeed, the most contested issue during the 1988 proxy season involved
poison pills. See Hetherington, Rights Plans: Reasonable Response to Threat, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 28, 1988, at 38, col. 1.
6. See Cohen, Lipton Asserts Corporate Boards Can Simply Reject Hostile Offers,
Wall. St. J., Nov. 4, 1988, at B5, col. 1; see also O'Connell, Defenses Help Boost Return to
Shareholders, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1988, at 38, col. 1 (board's refusal to redeem a rights
plan is the most frequently litigated issue in rights plan cases).
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The fiduciary standard applied when a board is faced with a request to
redeem a rights plan is the test developed in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co.8 Before the board receives the protection of the business judg-
ment rule,9 the board must show first that it had "reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed" and
second, that the defensive mechanism was "reasonable in relation to the
threat posed." 1
Courts generally hold that a board does not breach its fiduciary duties
when it refuses to redeem a rights plan in the face of two-tiered and
partial tender offers.11 Both types of tender offers are considered coer-
7. Some changes in corporate control, such as a merger, are negotiated or "friendly"
acquisitions. The management of the two corporations bargain over the terms, condi-
tions and future management. If the target corporation's board of directors approves of
the merger, it is submitted to the corporation's shareholders for approval. When a
"friendly acquisition" cannot be arranged, the bidder may seek to gain control through a
hostile takeover. The bidder makes a tender offer directly to the shareholders, thereby
bypassing the board of directors. See L. Solomon, D. Schwartz & J. Bauman, Corpora-
tions, Law and Policy: Materials and Problems 1033-34 (2d ed. 1988); see also E. Aranow
& H. Einhorn, Tender Offers for Corporate Control 70 (1973) (a tender offer is "[a]
public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to purchase
during a fixed period of time all or a portion of... securities of a publicly held corpora-
tion at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or securities"). Congress
regulates tender offers through the Williams Act. Corporate Equity Ownership-Disclo-
sure (Williams) Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 781-78n (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Other less frequently used methods of gaining con-
trol include proxy contests, see L. Solomon, D. Schwartz & J. Bauman, supra, at 1040-43,
and market sweeps, see Note, Proposed SEC Regulation of Market Sweeps: Should Mar-
ket Sweeps Be Governed By The Williams Act?, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 797 (1988).
8. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The Unocal test represents the Delaware rule in the
takeover context, and has been followed in other states. See Amanda Acquisition Corp.
v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009 (E.D. Wis.) (applying Wisconsin law),
aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners,
652 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn. 1986) (applying Minnesota law), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987). Some states, such as Ohio, have rejected the Unocal
test and have instead codified the traditional business judgment rule even in the takeover
context. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(C) (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1988).
9. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
10. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. After the Moran court concluded that the board had
the authority to adopt the rights plan, the court applied the Unocal test to examine
whether the board met its fiduciary burdens. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500
A.2d 1346, 1355-56 (Del. 1985). The court held that the board had fulfilled its fiduciary
obligations under Unocal in adopting the rights plan. See id. at 1357. Moreover, the
court indicated that the board's ultimate response in determining whether or not to re-
deem a rights plan would be judged by the Unocal standard. See id. Thus, courts have
applied this test when considering whether the board should redeem a rights plan during
a takeover attempt. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 (Del. Ch.
1988); cf Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595, 600-
02 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (citing Unocal standard, but stating that "the standard to be applied
should be whether a fully informed, wholly disinterested, reasonably courageous director
would dissent from the board's act in any material part").
11. See Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1298-99 (N.D. Ill.
1988); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). A partial tender offer is an offer to buy a controlling interest in a corporation, but
less than all of its shares. A two-tiered tender offer is a partial tender offer plus an an-
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cive"2 and therefore a threat to a corporation and its shareholders. A
rights plan may also be kept in place to assist a corporation, after the first
offer, to sell itself to the highest bidder in an auction, 3 in which case the
board is charged with getting the highest price for their shareholders. 4
Courts and commentators, however, debate whether a board should be
forced to redeem rights when the bidder has made an all-cash offer for
100 percent of a target's shares 5 which the board considers inadequate.1 6
An all-cash, all-shares offer, unlike two-tiered offers, has been viewed as
noncoercive and therefore not a threat to shareholders. 7 The board typ-
ically refuses to redeem the rights plan because it concludes after an eval-
uation study that the hostile tender offer is financially inadequate.1 8 As
nounced plan to follow up with a second step merger to eliminate the remaining share-
holders. In most instances, less consideration is offered in the second step than in the first
step. See Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Of-
fers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-over Provisions Under Delaware
Law, 11 Sec. Reg. J. 291, 293 (1984); Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and
Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1964, 1966-67
(1984).
12. Two-tiered tender offers and partial tender offers are considered coercive because
they pressure shareholders into tendering in the first tier out of fear of receiving less value
in the back end of the transaction or of becoming locked in as holders of devalued minor-
ity shares. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985); see
also 1 M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, Takeovers & Freezeouts § 1.08[1] (1988); infra notes
80-82 and accompanying text.
13. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986), the court stated that an auction arises when it becomes apparent to all that the
break-up of the company is inevitable and that the company will be sold. See id. at 182;
infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
15. Although bidders offer to purchase all of the target's outstanding shares, they
usually condition the offer upon a certain percentage of shares being tendered. See City
Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 792 (Del. Ch. 1988).
16. Compare Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984,
1013-16 (E.D. Wis.) (board permitted to reject an inadequate all-cash, all-shares offer),
aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) and Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Part-
ners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 849-50 (D. Minn. 1986) (same), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811
F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) and Cohen, supra note 6, at B5 (noting view that board may
reject inadequate tender offers) with Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049, 1060 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding board's refusal to redeem rights plan unreason-
able) and City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798-800 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(same) and Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in
Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 53, 87 n. 115 (1985)
(board's ability to defeat tender offer for 100% of stock should be limited).
17. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988); Rob-
ert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988). Since all-cash,
all-shares offers allow shareholders to tender all of their shares, shareholders are not sub-
ject to proration risks. See 1 M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 12, at § 1.09[3].
However, for a discussion of the coercive effect inherent in all tender offers, see notes 143-
53 and accompanying text.
18. A board might refuse to redeem rights and reject the takeover bid for reasons
other than price inadequacy. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955 (Del. 1985) (board may consider the impact of proposed transaction on "constituen-
cies" other than shareholders, including creditors, customers, employees and perhaps
even community in general). The Unocal "constituencies" concept has also been codified
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an alternative to the tender offer, the board may propose to its sharehold-
ers a financial restructuring that is designed to provide greater short-term
value than the tender offer. 19 The board may also decide to "just say no"
to the tender offer by rejecting the offer, declining to propose an alterna-
tive transaction and determining to proceed with the company's long-
term business plan.20 In either case, bidders argue that because the offer
is noncoercive and the only arguably objectionable feature of the offer is
price, the board should only be allowed to present information about the
offer and not to use the rights plan to prevent shareholders from deciding
whether to accept the offer.21
Some courts hold that an inadequate all-cash, all-shares offer repre-
sents a threat under Unocal and that a board's refusal to redeem rights is,
therefore, a reasonable response.22 These courts reason that a board has
a duty to protect the corporation and shareholders from harm, and con-
sider an inadequate offer harmful.23 Certain Delaware Chancery Court
cases, however, have indicated that a board may not preclude sharehold-
ers from acting on an all-cash, all-shares tender offer.24 In City Capital
Assocs. v. Interco Inc.25 and Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury
by many states. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1988); Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1988); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.251 (West Supp.
1989); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Whether a board may reject a
tender offer based on its effect on noninvestor interests is hotly debated. Compare Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101, 106 (1979) ("Our present
system of corporate governance places the directors at the center of corporate decision-
making and has expanded the corporation's responsibilities to safeguard interests broader
than those of shareholders alone.") with Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1191
(1981) (management is only accountable to shareholders). Price inadequacy, however, is
invariably the primary reason given for rejecting an offer and this Note focuses on
whether a board can refuse to redeem rights based on its inadequacy determination. For
a discussion of inadequacy, see infra note 90.
19. For an example of such a response, see Interco, 551 A.2d at 793-94.
20. Commentators have termed the board's actions when it does not propose an alter-
native transaction the "just say no" defense. See Cohen, supra note 6, at B5; see also
Norris, Universal Foods' Takeover Defense, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at D8, col. I (in
"just say no" defense, board asserts that proposed takeover is unwise and uses its poison
pill to prevent shareholders from selling shares to bidder).
21. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1053-54 (Del.
Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988).
22. See BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 475 (D. Del. 1988) (declining to
order redemption of rights plan because an inadequate offer represents a threat to share-
holders); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 849 (D. Minn. 1986) (ap-
plying Minnesota law) (board's refusal to redeem rights plan was reasonable response to
inadequate offer), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987); Nomad
Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,040, at 90,872 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988).
23. See BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 475; Gelco, 652 F. Supp. at 849; Nomad, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. at 90,872.
24. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060; Interco, 551 A.2d at 799-800. But see Nomad,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,872 (Delaware Chancery Court allowing board to reject
inadequate tender offer).
25. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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Co., 2 6 the Delaware Chancery Court held that a board may keep a rights
plan in place to buy time to consider and develop alternatives, but once
the end-stage 7 of a takeover contest is reached, the board must redeem
the rights and allow shareholders to decide the merits of the tender offer
themselves.2 s
This Note examines the fiduciary duty of a board that is faced with a
request to redeem rights after the bidder has made an all-cash, all-shares
tender offer that the board considers inadequate. Part I describes the
mechanics of a rights plan and the fiduciary duties governing requests to
redeem rights. This part analyzes the board's duties to redeem a rights
plan in the contexts of auctions and two-tiered tender offers, and also
reviews the Delaware Chancery Court's recent holdings in all-cash, all-
shares tender offer situations. Part II examines whether a board breaches
its fiduciary duties by refusing to redeem a rights plan when the bidder
has made an all-cash, all-shares tender offer which the board considers
inadequate and discusses the shortcomings of the Interco end-stage ap-
proach. Part III outlines the considerations that are appropriate in eval-
uating a board's decision to reject an offer based on price inadequacy.
This Note concludes that all-cash, all-shares tender offers are coercive,
and that a board should be allowed to refuse to redeem rights if it has
reasonably concluded that a tender offer is inadequate.
I. THE POISON PILL AND FIDUCIARY STANDARDS GOVERNING
REDEMPTION
A. The Mechanics of the Poison Pill
A poison pill is a defensive mechanism that a board of directors may
adopt in response to, or in anticipation of, a takeover attempt.29 "The
device most frequently associated with the term 'poison pill' is the Share
Purchase Rights Plan."3 °
Generally, the rights plan enables a board to create and distribute to
its common stockholders a dividend of one right to purchase common or
preferred stock, or both, of the issuer (target) or the acquiring entity.3 '
Initially, the rights are transferrable only with the common stock and are
26. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
27. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 798. For a discussion of the end-stage of a takeover
attempt, see infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
28. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060; Interco, 551 A.2d at 798.
29. See Dawson, Pence & Stone, Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 Bus. Law. 423
(1987).
30. 1 M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 12, at § 6.03[4][a]. Poison pills of this
nature are similar to the rights plan upheld in Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346, 1353-57 (Del. 1985). See generally Chittur, Wall Street's Teddy Bear: The Poison
Pill as a Takeover Defense, 11 J. Corp. L. 25, 26-32 (1985) (discussing earlier versions of
the poison pill).
31. See 1 M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 12, at § 6.03[4]; Dawson, Pence &
Stone, supra note 29, at 426-27.
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not exercisable.32 However, once a triggering event33 occurs, separate
rights certificates are distributed to the common stockholders and the
rights become exercisable.34
Although the rightholder is entitled to purchase either the issuer's
common or preferred stock once a triggering event occurs, the exercise
price of the right makes this purchase economically unfavorable to the
rightholder. 31 Exercise of the right becomes financially worthwhile only
if the bidder triggers either the flip-in or flip-over provisions of the plan
which deter takeovers by increasing the cost of acquisition. 6
The flip-in provision is triggered if the bidder acquires a specified
amount of the issuer's stock.37 The provision enables common stock-
holders of the issuer (the target) to purchase stock in the issuer at a dis-
count, typically at half price a.3  This in turn substantially increases the
shares the bidder must acquire. Thus, the flip-in provision makes an ac-
quisition far more expensive because it dilutes the investment and voting
power of an acquiring entity. 9
The flip-over provision is triggered if the bidder attempts to acquire
32. See id.
33. See Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (N.D. I1. 1988);
CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). A
triggering event is usually the earlier of ten days after an entity acquires a certain percent-
age of the issuer's stock (typically 20%) or commences a tender offer that would result in
the acquiring person (the bidder) owning a certain percentage of the issuer's stock (typi-
cally 30%). See Federated Dept. Stores, 683 F. Supp. at 437.
34. See Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 29, at 427.
35. See id. The exercise price is intended to reflect the company's long-term value.
See Desert Partners, 686 F. Supp. at 1296 & n. 14. The price, however, is usually "out of
the money" and does not have much impact on the effect of the plan. See Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985);
see also Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. at 437 (shareholders will not purchase stock
because exercise price of right is disadvantageous).
36. See Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 29, at 427-28.
37. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1006
(E.D. Wis.), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989); City Capital Assocs. v.
Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 791 (Del. Ch. 1988). Some rights plans contain flip-in provi-
sions that are triggered upon the occurrence of a self-dealing transaction involving the
issuer. See Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 29, at 428.
38. For example, assuming an exercise price of $75.00, the rightholder would be able
to purchase $150.00 worth of its own company's stock for $75.00. Thus, if the company's
stock is trading at $35.00 in the market, the provision allows each shareholder to
purchase at a 50 percent discount over four new shares for each share held. See Universal
Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. at 1006; Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 29, at 428.
39. The dilutive effect of a flip-in provision was noted in Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v.
The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988). The exercise price of Pills-
bury's rights plan was $100.00. Under the rights plan, once the triggering event oc-
curred, the rightholder received the right to purchase $200.00 worth of Pillsbury's stock
for $100.00. See id. Therefore, if Grand Metropolitan (the acquiring corporation) ac-
quired 85 percent of Pillsbury's stock in its $60.00 per share tender offer, the exercise of
Pillsbury's rights would reduce Grand Metropolitan's equity interest in Pillsbury from 85
percent to 56.3 percent. Moreover, its equity investment would decline by more than
$700 million. See id.
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control of the target through a merger or similar business combination.4
Under the flip-over provision, the rightholder is entitled to purchase
stock in the acquiring entity at a discount, again almost always at half
price, thereby diluting the equity of the acquiring entity's existing
stockholders."g
The rights plan's redemption provision enables the board to redeem
the rights for a nominal price.42 By redeeming the rights the board can
eliminate the devastating effects of the rights plan and allow a takeover to
occur.4 3 Thus, the redemption provision gives the board leverage to ne-
gotiate with the bidder and the ability to reject the bidder's offer. 4
B. The Board's Fiduciary Duties During a Takeover Attempt
Under state common law, the board is an active participant in the
tender offer process.45 The board's role in takeover contests is grounded
40. See Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. at 1007; Interco, 551 A.2d at 791-92;
Dawson, Pence & Stone, supra note 29, at 427.
Moran validated a rights plan containing only a flip-over provision. See Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985). Today, many rights plans have
both flip-in and flip-over provisions. See Note, supra note 4, at 184 (plans contain both
flip-in and flip-over provisions because flip-over provisions do not operate unless bidder
attempts merger).
41. For example, assuming an exercise price of $150.00, the rightholder would be able
to purchase $300.00 worth of the acquiring entity's stock for $150.00. See Dawson,
Pence & Stone, supra note 29, at 427.
42. Typically, the board reserves the power to redeem rights at $.01, .05 or .50 per
share any time before an entity acquires 20 percent or more of the issuer's stock or within
a specified time following such an accumulation. See 1 M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra
note 12, at § 6.03[4][a].
43. See Harvard Indus. v. Tyson, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 93,064, at 95,294 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 1986).
44. See Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066, 1083 (Del. Ch.), aff'd,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); see also Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d
250, 259 (7th Cir. 1986) (bidder has to negotiate with management in order to buy
target).
45. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 288 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980) (apply-
ing New Jersey law); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985); see also Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13
(N.D. Ill. 1969) (applying New York law) (board may take any legal steps to oppose
harmful takeover).
State common law allows the board to participate in tender offer situations, but unlike
traditional changes in corporate control, such as mergers and sales of assets, state corpo-
ration statutes are silent on a board's role during a tender offer. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann.
tit. 8, §§ 251(b), 252(c), 253(a), and 254(d) (1983 & 1988 Supp.) (requiring board ap-
proval for mergers before shareholders are permitted to vote on the matter); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1983 & 1988 Supp.) (requiring board approval for sale of all or
substantially all of corporation's assets before shareholders vote on matter). Some com-
mentators, therefore, have argued that the board should act passively during tender of-
fers. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1194. Others, recognizing the
similarity between mergers and tender offers, call for active board involvement. See Lip-
ton, supra note 18, at 116. The Delaware Supreme Court expressly rejected the passivity
theory in Unocal. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 n.10.
1989]
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in its responsibility to manage the business affairs of the corporation 46 in
accordance with its fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its
shareholders.47
Generally, the board has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders.48 This duty encompasses the obli-
gation to protect the corporate enterprise, including the shareholders,
from reasonably perceived harm.49 Thus, a board may actively oppose a
tender offer when, in the board's judgment, the offer is not in the best
interests of the corporation or its shareholders.
The board's duty to protect the corporation from harm, however, is
not absolute." The board must exercise its discretion in a manner con-
sistent with its traditional duties of care5' and loyalty. The directors'
duty of care includes the obligation to act in an informed manner,53 while
the duty of loyalty prohibits the board from engaging in self-dealing. 4
The board must fulfill these duties when conducting its activities and
exercising its business judgment. 5
Courts employ the business judgment rule to evaluate the board's busi-
ness decisions. Under the business judgment rule, directors' business de-
cisions are presumed to be informed, made in good faith and with the
honest belief that it is in the company's best interests.5 1 Courts will not
46. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 141(a) (1983); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953
(board's "duties and responsibilities proceed from the inherent powers conferred by 8
Del.C. § 141(a)" to manage the corporation).
47. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d
503, 510 (Del. 1939).
48. See Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
49. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
50. See id. at 955.
51. The duty of care is the responsibility of a director to exercise the care that a
"reasonably prudent person in a similar position would use under similar circumstances."
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); see also New York
Bus. Corp. Law § 717(a) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act
§ 8.30(a) (1984) (director shall act in good faith, with the care of an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position under similar circumstances and with company's best interests in
mind).
52. The duty of loyalty requires that the board act in good faith and that the board
not appear on both sides of a transaction or engage in self-dealing. See Norlin, 744 F.2d
at 264; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Rev. Model Bus. Corp.
Act § 8.31 (1984) (potential conflict of interest occurs when director has direct or indirect
interest in transaction).
53. SeeAronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985) (duty of care imposes on directors obligation "to proceed with a critical eye in
assessing information").
54. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264.
55. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73. In Delaware the standard of care applica-
ble to a directors' duty of care is gross negligence. See id. at 873; Aronson, 473 A.2d at
812 n.6. But see Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d
Cir. 1986) (applying New York law) (applying reasonable diligence standard).
56. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Gries Sports Enters. Inc. v. Cleveland Browns
Football Co., Inc., 26 Ohio St. 3d 15, 20, 496 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1986); see also Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (court will not substitute its judgment for
that of board if board's decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose). See
1989] SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLANS
interfere with the board's judgment unless the party challenging the
board's decision rebuts the presumptions of the business judgment rule.57
Although the business judgment rule was initially developed to protect
the board's judgments on questions of everyday corporate policy and
management,58 it is also applied in takeover contests.59 In the takeover
context, where defensive tactics are being employed, the courts focus on
the duty of loyalty because a board has an obvious conflict of interest
when making decisions about changes in corporate control.6°
Unocal significantly changed the application of the business judgment
rule to contests for corporate control and, ultimately, to the redemption
of rights.6 1 The Delaware Supreme Court adopted a two-prong test
generally Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisted, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 93, 130 (1979)
(rebuttable presumption that directors exercised their business judgment in good faith
and with corporation's best interests in mind).
The business judgment rule derives from, and is an acknowledgment of, the broad
powers given to directors to manage the affairs of a corporation. See Asarco Inc. v.
M.R.H. A. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D.N.J. 1985); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); see also Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral
Principles, 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 465, 490 (1985) (courts respect directors' business decisions
because Delaware General Corporation Law § 141(a) provides that directors make deci-
sions). The business judgment rule also recognizes that courts are not equipped to evalu-
ate business judgments. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
57. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.) (courts will not
interfere with board's business judgment unless plaintiff shows fraud, bad faith, gross
overreaching or abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Aronson, 473
A.2d at 812; see also Arsht, supra note 56, at 111 (court will not set aside a corporate
transaction that does not involve self-dealing unless directors do not exercise due care,
good faith or reasonably believe that transaction was in corporation's best interests). If
the challenging party rebuts one of the rule's presumptions then the board loses the pro-
tections of the rule and the transaction will be subject to judicial scrutiny. See Hanson
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 280 (2d Cir. 1986) (board did
not fulfill duty of care so court enjoined a lock-up option). If the transaction involves
self-dealing the business judgment rule does not apply and the board must show the in-
trinsic fairness of the transaction. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del.
1983). Intrinsic fairness involves an analysis of both fair dealing and fair price. Id.
58. See Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
59. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980);
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Pogostin
v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
60. See Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962); see also Northwest Indus.,
Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (directors may be
accused of acting to save their jobs at corporation's expense when tender offer is rejected).
Courts, however, recognize that the board cannot avoid the conflict of interest problem in
takeover situations, and therefore should not lose altogether the presumptions of the busi-
ness judgment rule. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); see also Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest
and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. Law. 35, 60 (1966) (takeover attempt thrusts directors
into unavoidable conflict of interest situation).
61. Prior to Unocal, plaintiffs had to show that a board's primary motive in the take-
over context was to retain control in order to rebut the presumptions of the business
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which must be satisfied before the board's decisions in the takeover con-
text are protected by the business judgment rule.62 First, the board must
show that it had "reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to cor-
porate policy and effectiveness existed."63 This burden is satisfied by a
showing of "good faith and reasonable investigation."'  Second, the
board's defensive measure must be "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed.""5
The Unocal test governs the board's conduct when adopting or imple-
menting rights plans and other defensive mechanisms.66 Although some
commentators have questioned whether Unocal subjects directors to
greater scrutiny, 67 others have noted that its reasonableness requirement
completely overwhelms the traditional duty of care and loyalty require-
judgment rule. If that burden was met, the directors would then have to show that the
transaction had a valid corporate purpose. See Treadway, 638 F.2d at 382; Trueblood,
629 F.2d at 293. The test, known as the "primary purpose test," was similar to the
traditional business judgment rule where the board had to show that it acted in the best
interests of the corporation or for a rational business purpose. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199
A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964); Note, Corporate Auctions and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A
Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 276, 282 n.30 (1988). The
Unocal test represents an intermediate position between the traditional business judgment
rule and the intrinsic fairness test which is employed in self-dealing situations. See Rob-
ert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988); Gilson & Kraak-
man, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to
Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. Law. 247, 248-51 (1989).
62. The court created an enhanced duty "[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985).
63. Id. at 955. The first prong of the Unocal test ensures that a defensive measure
designed to prevent a takeover is motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the
corporation and its shareholders. See id. The court listed examples of concerns which a
board might have in analyzing the nature of a bid including: (a) inadequacy of the price
offered; (b) nature and timing of the offer; (c) questions of illegality; (d) the impact on
constituencies other than shareholders; (e) the risk of nonconsummation; and (f) the
quality of the securities being offered in an exchange. See id. Unocal also states that a
finding that the first prong is satisfied will be materially enhanced if the defensive measure
was approved by a majority of the outside independent directors. See id. The importance
of a vote of independent directors was taken from an earlier Delaware case. See Puma v.
Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971).
64. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
65. Id. at 955. The second prong adds an element of balance by requiring that the
board analyze the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporation. Because of
the balancing requirement, the test is sometimes referred to as the proportionality test.
See TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) t 94,334, at 92,174 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 61,
at 249-51.
66. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354, 1356 (Del. 1985).
67. See Note, Discrimination Against Shareholders in Opposing a Hostile Takeover, 59
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1319, 1330 (1986) (first prong of Unocal test is still weak because board
can always articulate that a threat exists); Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 72 Va. L. Rev. 851, 867 (1986) (first prong is still the traditional business judgment
rule).
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ments.6 s One court noted that the Unocal test increases the possibility
that a court will substitute its judgment for that of the board.6 9 Until
recently, however, courts rarely found that a defensive response was un-
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.7°
C. Redemption of Rights Plans Under the Unocal Standard
1. Auctions and Two-Tier Tender Offers
Court decisions evaluating a board's use of a rights plan may be sepa-
rated into three categories: requests to redeem rights during an auction of
a company, 7 requests to redeem rights when a bidder has made a two-
tiered tender offer,72 and requests to redeem rights when the bidder has
made an all-cash, all-shares tender offer.7 3
Courts have refused to grant the bidder's request for redemption of the
rights plan during an auction of the company. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
68. See Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware
Supreme Court, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 117, 118 (1986).
69. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796-97 (Del. Ch. 1988);
see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 61, at 271-73 (suggesting active judicial review
for effective proportionality test).
70. Prior to Interco and Pillsbury, only two Delaware courts found defensive re-
sponses unreasonable in relation to the threat posed. See Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v.
Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton &
Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
71. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 440-41
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Doskocil Cos. Inc. v. Griggy, No. 10,095 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988)
(LEXIS, States library, Del file); Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 93,764, at 98,586-87 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988);
Facet Enters., Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988) (LEXIS,
States library, Del file).
In most cases, standing to sue for redemption of the rights plan is not at issue. Typi-
cally, the bidder acquires stock in the target corporation before announcing a tender offer
and is also a shareholder when it files suit seeking redemption. The Interco court held
that the bidder has standing to assert the rights of a shareholder of a target company. See
City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 800 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also Lipton v.
News Int'l, 514 A.2d 1075, 1078-79 (Del. 1987) (suggesting shareholder seeking control
has standing to assert breach of fiduciary duty claims). In any event shareholder class
actions typically proceed on the same schedule as an action by the bidder. See Grand
Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1050 (Del. Ch. 1988) (shareholder
action consolidated with bidder's action); Interco, 551 A.2d at 800 n.18.
72. See Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1298-99 (N.D. Ill.
1988); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (also involved an auction situation).
73. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D.
Wis.), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989); Southdown, Inc. v. Moore
McCormack Resources, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1988); BNS Inc. v. Koppers
Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 461 (D. Del. 1988); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F.
Supp. 829, 837 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.
1987); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. Ch.
1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 792 (Del. Ch. 1988); Nomad
Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,040 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988).
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drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,' the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the board's duty changes during an auction.75 Generally, an auction sit-
uation arises when the board recognizes that the company will be sold.7 6
During an auction the board's role is that of an auctioneer; it must get
the best price for the shareholders.7 7 Courts have used the Revlon princi-
ple to deny requests to redeem the rights plan during an active auction
because of the ability of the rights plan to generate the highest price for
shareholders. 78 The plan's redemption provision gives the board time to
conduct a proper auction and negotiate leverage which enables it to elicit
higher bids.79
Courts also deny requests to redeem a rights plan when the offeror has
made a two-tiered tender offer.8" Two-tiered tender offers have the effect
74. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
75. See id. at 182.
76. Although Revlon indicated that an auction arises when the break-up of the com-
pany is inevitable, it is not always clear when a Revlon auction arises, ends or is con-
ducted fairly. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,071, (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 1988) (involving fairness of
auction process), rev'd, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,401 (Del. May 3,
1989); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 801-03 (Del. Ch. 1988) (re-
structuring plan did not require Revlon auction); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) (Revlon duties did not arise because target was
never for sale and there was no bidding contest or sale); see also Note, supra note 61, at
276 n.8.
77. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
78. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that refusal to redeem rights is reasonable response in auction
situation); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,071, at 91,024 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 1988) (board may maintain
rights plan to promote continuation of auction, but once auction ends plan should be
redeemed to allow shareholders to choose between two competing offers), rev'd on other
grounds, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,401 (Del. May 3, 1989); Dos-
kocil Cos. v. Griggy, No. 10095 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Del file)
(board not required to redeem rights when conducting auction even if first tender offer is
adequate); Tate & Lyle Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-1988 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,764 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988) (court did not order
redemption during continuing auction because current market price was higher than
tender offer); Facet Enters., Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15,
1988) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (did not order redemption because auction was
about to begin).
79. See Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. at 438-40. Most commentators recog-
nize that the rights plan benefits shareholders during an active auction. See Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Of-
fers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 868-70 (1981) (management may use bargaining tactics to get
shareholders higher premium); Oesterle, supra note 16, at 91 (the redemption provision
makes the rights plan a legitimate defensive tactic because target managers can negotiate
for a higher price); Note, "Poison Pills" as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the
Corporate Takeover Wars, 1987 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 459, 471-77 (1987); Note, supra note
4, at 204-07. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1175 (management's resis-
tence to tender offer designed to increase the premium offered is harmful because it will
ultimately reduce the number of premium tender offers).
80. Because of its enhanced coercive effect, the two-tiered tender offer was considered
the most effective way of completing a tender offer during the early 1980's. See 1 M.
Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 12, at 1.08[1].
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of coercing shareholders into tendering their shares in the first tier be-
cause of the uncertainty concerning the consideration to be received in
the second tier.s" Because of the coercive nature of the offer, courts have
concluded that refusing to redeem a rights plan is a reasonable response
when the bidder has made a two-tiered tender offer.8 2
2. All-Cash, All-Shares Tender Offers
Today, most tender offers are all-cash, all-shares tender offers.8 3 The
bidder typically promises to merge out, in a second step, any untendered
shares for the same consideration as the original tender offer.8s Some
courts hold that this type of offer does not pose a significant threat to
shareholders and, thus, are less inclined to allow a target board to use a
rights plan to preclude shareholders from deciding on the tender offer.8 5
This view emphasizes that the shareholders are the owners of the corpo-
ration and, therefore, they have the right to make the ultimate decision
concerning the sale of their shares.86
81. See Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). The coercive aspect of the two-tiered tender offer is commonly known as the
prisoner's dilemma.
Under the "prisoner's dilemma," individual dispersed shareholders are forced
to tender their shares into a partial offer regardless of whether they think the
offer being proposed gives them full and fair value. They act out of fear that
other shareholders, with whom they cannot communicate or collaborate, will
tender and thus enable the bidder to relegate the non-tendering shareholder to
the distinctly less attractive position of minority shareholder in a company con-
trolled by a majority interest.
Id. at 1255; see also Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for
Legislation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 307-09 (1983) (discussing prisoner's dilemma); Note,
supra note 11, at 1966 (same). But see Gilson, supra note 79, at 859 (prisoner's dilemma
present only if gain from premium offered is less than anticipated loss on shares retained
after offer's success).
82. See Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1298-99 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (two-tiered offer coerces shareholders into tendering their shares and threatens tar-
get's corporate effectiveness); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp.
422, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (board clearly has the right to reject two-tiered tender offer).
83. See I M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 12, at 1.08[l] (availability of junk
bond financing has made two-tiered tender offers rare). The all-cash, all-shares offer is
also preferred because bidders are well aware of courts' dissatisfaction with coercive two-
tier offers. See TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,176 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (bidder amended hostile
partial tender offer to an all-shares offer). Moreover, bidders recognize that an all-cash,
all-shares bid at a substantial premium over market will put pressure on a board to re-
deem a rights plan. See Cohen, supra note 6, at B5. If a board refuses to redeem rights
and a bidder withdraws the tender offer, the board may face the wrath of angry share-
holders who were denied a chance to sell their stock at a premium. See id.
84. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988); see
also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1007 (E.D.
Wis.) (majority of tender offers in 1988 intended back-end mergers), aff'd on other
grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
85. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1060 (Del. Ch.
1988); Interco, 551 A.2d at 798-99.
86. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 799-800 (employing poison pill to prevent shareholders
from choosing to accept noncoercive offer is inconsistent with traditional corporate gov-
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Recently, in Interco and Pillsbury, the Delaware Chancery Court or-
dered the boards to redeem the rights plan to allow shareholders to
decide on an all-cash, all-shares offer.8 7 The Interco court found it signif-
icant that the redemption question arose at the end-stage of the takeover
battle.88 The battle was at its end-stage because the court concluded that
the rights plan was no longer being used to force the bidder to increase its
offer nor was it needed to give the board time to respond to the offer.89
Both the Interco and Pillsbury boards, based on valuation studies con-
ducted by their financial advisers, had concluded that the offers were in-
adequate,90 and, as an alternative, proposed a financial restructuring of
ernance notions and threatens the legitimacy and authority of corporation law); Pillsbury,
558 A.2d at 1060 n.10 (court cites Conoco Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) which stated:
the Board of Directors are under a duty to exercise their best business judgment
with respect to ... tender offers. They may be right; they may know what is
best for the corporation, but their judgment is not conclusive upon the share-
holders. What is sometimes lost sight of in these tender offer controversies is
that the shareholders, not the directors, have the right of franchise with respect
to the shares owned by them; "stockholders, once informed of the facts, have a
right to make their own decisions in matters pertaining to their economic self-
interest .... .
Id. (citation omitted); see also Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, Inc.,
686 F. Supp. 595, 596, 605 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (ordering board to redeem rights plan be-
cause owners of target corporation should have the opportunity to exercise their own
business judgment concerning the offer). Non-redemption cases have also expressed this
view. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (same);
Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(same); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112-13 (Del. Ch.
1986) (precursor of Interco shareholder choice doctrine); see also Gilson, supra note 79, at
869 (defensive tactics should not preempt shareholder decisions); Note, Shareholder
Rights Plans-Do They Render Shareholders Defenseless Against Their Own Manage-
ment?, 12 Del. J. Corp. L. 991, 1005-06 (1987) (plan interferes with private transactions
between bidders and shareholders).
87. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060; Interco, 551 A.2d at 790-91; see also Southdown,
686 F. Supp. at 596 (district court, applying Delaware law, ordered redemption of rights
plan).
88. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 (Del. Ch. 1988).
89. See id. at 790, 800 n.17 (bidder's offers had come to the top of their range).
In Pillsbury, the bidder initially filed suit seeking to have the rights redeemed before the
end-stage was reached. See Grand Metro. PLC v. The Pillsbury Co., No. 10317 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 7, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). The bidder argued that sufficient
time had passed and the target had not proposed any alternative transaction to sharehold-
ers. The court, however, stated that the target may explore its alternatives indefinitely
and that in the meantime the board does not breach its fiduciary duties by refusing to
redeem the rights. The court noted the independence of the directors (who concluded
that the offer was inadequate), the absence of any significant challenge to the board's
good faith and the board's consideration of the merits of the offer at a lengthy meeting
where it received written opinions from two investment bankers stating that the offer was
inadequate. The court also stated that a "just say no" defense may not be appropriate
when the offer is an all-cash, all-shares offer.
90. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 792. Interco's advisers concluded that the company had
a value in the $74.00" to $87.00 range. See id. The bidder ultimately raised its offer to
$74.00 and indicated a willingness to negotiate a higher price. See id. at 794. The target's
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the corporation.91 Although the target boards acted in good faith and
were fully informed when concluding that the offers were inadequate, the
courts held that the rights plan could not be used to prevent the share-
holders from choosing between the tender offers and the boards' restruc-
turing plans.92 The bidders' all-cash, all-shares offers posed a threat
solely to the shareholders' economic interests and unlike two-tiered offers
were not considered coercive. 93 Therefore, because the contests had
reached the end-stage-the rights plans were no longer being used to
negotiate an increase in the offer, to conduct an auction, or to implement
advisers termed the $74.00 to $87.00 calculation as a "reference range," but the court
found the "reference range" concept deliberately unclear. See id. at 792.
Generally, a board supports its decision to reject a tender offer by terming it inade-
quate. See Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public
Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. Law. 1439,
1454 (1981). Inadequacy means that the target reasonably believes that it has a substan-
tial chance of obtaining or generating higher value for shareholders. See id. Inadequacy
does not, however, mean that the offer is unfair. See id. In Interco, the target stated that
the "reference range" is an indication of the company's intrinsic value which helps deter-
mine the adequacy or inadequacy of an offer. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 15, City
Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (No. 10105); see also infra
note 109. The view that an offer below the company's intrinsic value is inadequate is in
accordance with Delaware precedent. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (offer grossly inadequate so board acted reason-
ably in protecting shareholders from takeover at a price below company's intrinsic value);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985) (finding breach of duty of care
because board was not informed of company's intrinsic value).
91. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 793-94. The restructuring consisted of a cash dividend,
debentures, convertible preferred stock and a remaining equity interest in the company
(stub interest) which was estimated to trade at a certain value. See id. The board's bank-
ers valued the package at $76.00 per share. The financing for the restructuring was to
come from the sale of certain assets representing approximately one-half of the com-
pany's gross sales and from $2.025 billion in loans. See id.
The alternative plan in Pillsbury, consisting primarily of the spin-off of Burger King
and the sale of certain assets and ultimately the whole company within the next few
years, was speculated to be deliberately vague in order to distinguish it from the Interco
precedent. See Gibson & Smith, Doughboy's Defeat: How Pillsbury Failed to Act Deci-
sively in Bid to Repel Grand Met, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1988, at Al, col. 6. The target,
however, did not escape the Interco precedent by withholding its alternative plan. Some
commentators, however, view the Pillsbury decision as actually a test and rejection of the
"just say no" defense. See id.; Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989
Duke L.J. 54, 77 (1989).
92. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 798. The Interco court doubted whether the target's
proposed restructuring was worth more than the tender offer. See id. at 799. The court,
therefore, concluded that a reasonable shareholder could prefer the tender offer over the
restructuring. See id. The Pillsbury court, however, stated that the real threat to share-
holders is the possibility of the company's stock price dropping to the pre-offer level if the
rights are not redeemed. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1058.
Surprisingly, the Interco court declined to enjoin the restructuring because it found it
to be a reasonable response to the threat of an inadequate offer. See Interco, 551 A.2d at
800-01. Thus, the court would have permitted the target to undergo significant structural
changes which might have imperiled the bidder from completing its transaction. See id.
But see Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1061-62 (court ordered redemption of rights and enjoined
proposed restructuring).
93. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060; City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d
787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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an alternative transaction-the rights were ordered redeemed to allow
the shareholders to decide.94
The Interco and Pillsbury redemption requirement applies when the
board proposes an alternative transaction. It is unclear, however,
whether the Delaware courts would allow a board to "just say no" to a
tender offer based on price inadequacy and the board's confidence in the
long-term potential of the corporation. Recently, the Delaware Chan-
cery Court in TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., noted that
Interco and Pillsbury did not address whether a rights plan must be re-
deemed when the board does not propose an alternative transaction, but
instead decides to continue its long-term business plans.96 Interco, Pills-
bury and other Delaware Chancery decisions, however, have certainly
implied that a "just say no" defense would not be looked upon
favorably.97
94. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060; Interco, 551 A.2d at 798; see also Southdown,
Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1988). In South-
down, the court ordered the target board to redeem its rights plan in the face of an all-
cash, all-shares tender offer and enjoined the target's recapitalization. Southdown, 686 F.
Supp. at 596. The court concluded that the plan was no longer being used for a legitimate
purpose. Id. at 602. In Southdown, however, unlike Interco, the board's recapitalization
plan was strictly intended to make the company unattractive to a buyer and not to pro-
vide shareholders with value. Id. at 599-600. Moreover, the court concluded that the
board had no basis for calling the tender offer inadequate. Id. at 603.
95. [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
96. See TW Services, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,180; Interco,
551 A.2d at 798 n.13. In TWServices, Chancellor Allen, who served as chancellor in
Interco, characterized the redemption issue as the conflict between the board's duty to
protect the shareholders' long-term interests and the duty to maximize shareholders' cur-
rent short-term interests. See TWServices, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,178. Chancel-
lor Allen stated that the board maximizes short-term interests by entering a Revlon
auction mode and that this mode exists when the board proposes a recapitalization be-
cause of its similarity to the sale of the company. See id. at 92,180. The issue, however,
which was not addressed in either Interco or Pillsbury is whether a board must maximize
shareholders' short-term value when it desires to continue managing the corporation in a
long-term mode. See id. The court in TWServices avoided this issue by holding that the
bidder's tender offer, conditioned upon board approval, was an invitation to negotiate a
merger and not the usual tender offer. Therefore, the court did not apply the Unocal test,
but rather used the traditional business judgment rule which allows the board to decline
the invitation to merge provided it acts in the good faith pursuit of a legitimate corporate
purpose. See id. at 92,182.
97. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060; Grand Metro. PLC v. The Pillsbury Co., No.
10317 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Del file); Interco, 551 A.2d at 797-
98; see also MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 94,179, at 91,634-35 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988) (denying request
to redeem rights plan because offer was pending for a short time and suggesting that it
would not deny shareholders the opportunity to make their own investment decision con-
cerning the offer). But see Meyers, Showdown in Delaware: The Battle to Shape Takeover
Law, Institutional Investor, Feb. 1989, at 77 (indicating that the Delaware Supreme
Court may disagree with the chancery court's reasoning on this matter).
The use of a rights plan to reject a tender offer was also questioned in the recent battle
for control of Time, Inc. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [Current
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,265 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), afl'd,
Literary Partners, L.P. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 279, 283, 284 (Del. July 24, 1989) (LEXIS,
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II. THE INTERACTION OF A BOARD'S FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE
TENDER OFFER PROCESS
A. The Threat Posed by Inadequate All-Cash,
All-Shares Tender Offers
Traditional fiduciary principles require that the board protect the
shareholders and the corporation from threatened harm.9" The board
fulfills this duty during a takeover attempt by considering, among other
things, the financial adequacy of a tender offer.9 9 Courts, therefore, have
not considered it a breach of fiduciary duty when a board rejects and
defends against a tender offer because the offer is inadequate."°
For example, in Pogostin v. Rice, 10 the stockholders brought a deriva-
tive suit charging that the board wrongfully rejected a tender offer."02
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the board's refusal to accept a
premium tender offer was not a prima facie breach of fiduciary duty.0 3
Moreover, the court stated that a principle requiring a board to accept
any offer which includes a premium over the prevailing market price
would "rob corporate boards of all discretion, forcing them to choose
between accepting any tender offer ... or facing the likelihood of per-
sonal liability if they reject it."'" Thus, the court concluded that a board
States library, Del file). In Time, the Delaware Chancery Court held that Time's restruc-
turing of its acquistion agreement with Warner Communications was a reasonable re-
sponse to the threat posed by Paramount's hostile tender offer for Time. See id. at
93,283-84. The court stated that a target board has the right to manage the corporation
in a long-term mode "pursuant to a preexisting business plan." See id. Nevertheless, the
chancery court noted that different considerations may exist when the board rejects a
tender offer simply by refusing to redeem a rights plan. See id. at 93,284 n.22.
98. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. See also Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1337-38 (Del. 1987) (board has both power and
duty to oppose threatening tender offers).
99. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see also
Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
(management has responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment, are detri-
mental to corporation and its shareholders); Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and
Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, 11 Sec. Reg. L.J. 44, 47 (1983)
(board may legitimately consider offer undesirable because offer is inadequate); Lipton,
supra note 18, at 101-02 (board may reject tender offer if it concludes that it is inade-
quate). But see Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a
Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 403, 440-41 (1980) (price inadequacy alone should
not be a proper motivation for defensive tactics because shareholders are capable of deter-
mining value of stock).
100. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980); Ana-
conda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also GAF Corp. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (board's decision to re-
ject inadequate offer was a reasonable and informed exercise of board's business judg-
ment); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (informed decision to reject
takeover proposal is not prima facie breach of fiduciary duty).
101. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
102. Id. at 622.
103. Id. at 627.
104. Id. The court added that "[t]o put directors to such a Hobson's choice would be
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has the right to reject a tender offer which it deems inadequate as long as
it carefully informs itself of the company's value before acting.' 05
While Pogostin holds that a board may reject an inadequate tender
offer, Smith v. Van Gorkom' 06 strongly suggests that a board has a duty
to ensure that the company is not sold for an inadequate price. In Van
Gorkom the board agreed to a merger at a substantial premium over the
prevailing market price. 10 7 Although the merger was subsequently ap-
proved by a majority of the shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court
held the board liable for breaching its duty of care in approving the
sale.'0 The court found that the board failed to ascertain the company's
intrinsic value' 019 and hastily agreed to sell the company for an inade-
quate price. " 0 Van Gorkom, therefore, goes beyond Pogostin because it
obligates the board to refrain from selling the company for a price below
the company's intrinsic value."1
Nevertheless, both Interco and Pillsbury rejected the argument that
price inadequacy is a sufficient Unocal threat to justify refusing to redeem
the antithesis of the principles upon which a proper exercise of business judgment is
demanded of them. The ultimate loss would, of course, be upon the shareholders." Id.
105. See id.; see also Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706,
712-13 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (if board is informed and scrupulously fair in considering tender
offer, it may take any step not forbidden by law to prevent takeover).
The Pillsbury court refused to apply Pogostin in the context of a request to redeem a
rights plan. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1059 (Del.
Ch. 1988). The court reasoned that Pogostin was decided before the formulation of the
Unocal test and before the approval of the rights plan in Moran. See id. The Pillsbury
court, however, failed to recognize that Moran also relied on pre-Unocal cases, including
Pogostin, when discussing the board's fiduciary duties in adopting and implementing a
rights plan. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985). Pre-
sumably then, cases decided under traditional fiduciary principles are relevant in applying
the Unocal test.
106. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
107. See id. at 866-70. The company's CEO initially proposed a $55.00 per share sale
to a takeover specialist during a period when the company's stock price traded in the
$38.00 to $29.00 range. Id. at 866 & n.5.
108. Id. at 893.
109. See id. at 875-77. The traditional definition of intrinsic value emphasizes the role
of different factors: the value justified by assets, earnings, dividends, definite prospects
and the factor of management. See S. Cottle, R. Murray, & F. Block, Graham and
Dodd's Security Analysis 41-50 (5th ed. 1988). In essence, the intrinsic value of a firm is
its economic value as a going concern, taking into account all of its characteristics, the
nature of its business and the investment environment. See id.; see also Lowenstein, supra
note 81, at 275 (intrinsic value reflects the price that a private buyer would pay if, in a
freely negotiated transaction, with access to all material information, he were buying the
enterprise as a whole).
110. Id. at 874.
111. Although Van Gorkom involved a merger, and therefore the board had a defined
statutory role, its significance has been noted in tender offer decisions. See Gelco Corp. v.
Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 849-50 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [Current
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,401, at 92,596 (Del. May 3, 1989). Moreover,
Unocal clearly established that the board has an active role in matters concerning funda-
mental corporate change, including tender offers. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 & n.8.
1989] SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLANS
a rights plan.' 12 In reaching these decisions, both courts failed to recog-
nize the implications of minimizing the threat of price inadequacy and
failed to consider the court's decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.,1 13 which characterized price inadequacy as a Uno-
cal threat.11 4 In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
adoption of a rights plan was a reasonable response to the threat of a
hostile takeover at a price below the company's intrinsic value."' The
court found that the board acted in good faith and upon reasonable in-
vestigation, and did not breach its fiduciary duties in concluding that the
all-cash, all-shares offer was grossly inadequate and a threat to the corpo-
rate enterprise. 6 Revlon indicates that a rights plan is an appropriate
112. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1057-58 (Del.
Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988) (inade-
quate offer is threat in sense that target may be able to negotiate higher price, but share-
holders must be permitted to choose at some point).
113. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
114. See id. at 181. Moreover, the court in Unocal stated that the inadequacy of price
offered is a concern which a board may consider in determining the effect of a bid on the
corporate enterprise. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985). Although Unocal involved the threat of a two-tiered offer, the court did not pre-
clude characterizing inadequate all-cash, all-shares offers as a threat to the corporate
enterprise. See id. at 956. The court stated that the lower court "specifically found that
the 'directors' decision [to oppose the Mesa tender offer] was made in the good faith belief
that the Mesa tender offer is inadequate.' Given our standard of review... we are satis-
fied that Unocal's board has met its burden of proof." Id. at 958 (citations omitted). The
decision appears to indicate that the inadequacy of the offer by itself is a sufficient threat
to the corporation and its shareholders. See id.; Note, supra note 67, at 1329 (Unocal
court concluded that opposing an inadequate tender offer is valid business purpose); see
also Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1299 & n.21 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(target board reasonably perceived price of tender offer as threat to corporation); Robert
M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1240 (Del. Ch. 1988) (argument that an
inadequate offer represents threat is plausible); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1342-43 (Del. 1987) (focusing on threat of two-tiered offer, but
also indicating that price inadequacy is independent threat to corporation and sharehold-
ers). In Evans, however, the court stated that the tender offer was not a threat because
the offer was subject to negotiation. See Evans, 552 A.2d at 1240. Other courts, however,
have clearly stated that a board does not have a duty to negotiate. See Amanda Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1013 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd on other
grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989); Desert Partners, 686 F. Supp. at 1300; Ivanhoe
Partners, 535 A.2d at 1344-45; see also BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 476
(D. Del. 1988) (target's duty to negotiate is questionable).
115. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181. The issue of the board's use of the rights plan was
mooted by the board's resolution to redeem the rights in connection with any offers equal
to or above a certain price. See id.
116. See id. The court also upheld an exchange offer designed to thwart a hostile take-
over, concluding that this was a reasonable response to the threat of a grossly inadequate
offer. See id. See also McBride, Conflicting Claims Remain an Issue in Delaware Cases,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at S14, col. 4 (noting that Pillsbury court, in citing Revlon,
indicates that board may refuse to redeem rights if offer is grossly inadequate). Although
Revlon used the term "grossly inadequate," it is not clear whether the court meant that
only grossly inadequate offers are threats. Courts have not always made the distinction.
See BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 474-75 (D. Del. 1988); Gelco Corp. v.
Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 849 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987).
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defensive measure against the threat of inadequate tender offers. It is
inconsistent, therefore, to assert that a board may adopt a rights plan to
protect shareholders from an inadequate all-cash, all-shares offer, but
then must redeem the plan even though an inadequate tender offer is
made.
Some federal courts have also held that an inadequate all-cash, all-
shares offer does represent a threat under Unocal, and that the refusal to
redeem rights is a reasonable response. 1 7 In Gelco Corp. v. Coniston
Partners,"8 the bidder made an all-cash, all-shares offer that the board,
after meeting with its financial advisers, concluded was inadequate.' 19
The court held that the board's refusal to redeem the rights plan was a
reasonable response to the threat of an inadequate tender offer.' 2 ' The
court also recognized that the board has a fiduciary duty to adopt defen-
sive measures to defeat a takeover attempt which is contrary to the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders.' 2'
Recently, a Wisconsin federal district court in Amanda Acquisition
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.,'22 allowed a board to "just say no" to an
all-cash, all-shares tender offer. 123 The target argued that its desire to
remain independent was justified by the company's bright prospects and
by the inadequacy of the tender offer.' 24 The court held that the offer's
117. See BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 475; Gelco, 652 F. Supp at 849-50; Nomad Acquisition
Corp. v. Damon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040,
at 90,872 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988).
118. 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th
Cir. 1987).
119. See id. at 849.
120. See id, at 849-50. In BNS, the court held that the board did not breach its fiduci-
ary duties by refusing to redeem a rights plan in the face of an inadequate all-cash, all-
shares tender offer. See BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 475. The bidder, much like the bidders in
Interco and Pillsbury, argued that the all-cash offer was not a threat, and that the refusal
to redeem the rights plan was unreasonable. See id. The court, however, disagreed and
stated that "the inadequacy of the offering price does present a threat to the company and
its stockholders." Id.
121. See Gelco, 652 F. Supp. at 849. The court stated that "[d]irectors have not only
the right, but a duty, to adopt defensive measures to defeat a takeover attempt contrary to
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders." Id.; See also Nomad Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. Damon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q
94,040, at 90,872 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988). In Nomad, the board refused to redeem the
rights plan in the face of an all-cash, all-shares tender offer. The court held that the
board acted reasonably in refusing to redeem the rights because financial advisers valued
the company in excess of the tender offer price and because the post tender offer market
price was higher than the tender offer. See id. Moreover, the court stated that the board
has both the duty and the responsibility to oppose inadequate offers even when the offer is
all-cash. See id.
122. 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.
1989).
123. Because the circuit court affirmed the district court's ruling on the constitutional-
ity of Wisconsin's takeover statute, it found it unnecessary to decide the poison pill re-
demption issue. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496,
500 (7th Cir. 1989). The circuit court, however, noted that it did not endorse the district
court's views concerning the threats of tender offers. See id. at 499 n.4.
124. See Universal Foods, 708 F. Supp. at 10 13-14. The target board stated that it was
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inadequacy,1 25 its timing, 126 and its threat to the viability of the corpora-
tion 127 allowed the board to preclude shareholder choice by refusing to
redeem the rights plan.128 Although the court declined to state that price
inadequacy alone justifies precluding shareholder choice,129 the court
not saying no to the offer, but was instead saying yes to its future prospects. The target's
counsel had indicated that one of the principal purposes of the rights plan is to allow a
company to remain independent when a proposed tender offer does not reflect the com-
pany's present and future value as an ongoing business entity. See id. at 1006; see also
Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,040, at 90,869 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (rights plan recommended as
means of ensuring that shareholders' receive full value for their shares). The decisions
ordering a board to redeem a rights plan conclude that the plans should be used only as a
bargaining mechanism for a limited time period or as a defense against two-tiered tender
offers. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1058 (Del. Ch.
1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797-98 (Del. Ch. 1988).
125. See Universal Foods, 708 F. Supp. at 1015-16. The board did not obtain an invest-
ment banker's opinion as to the adequacy of the offer because it believed that it was
familiar enough with the company's business plans to make the inadequacy determina-
tion. See id. at 1010. The bidder argued that the board's failure to obtain an opinion was
a breach of its fiduciary duty of care. See id. at 1013. The court disagreed and concluded
that the board properly "ascertained from their own knowledge and experiences that the
offer was inadequate in light of the future prospects of the company." Id. The court,
however, indicated its discomfort with a board determination and stated that an opinion
may be necessary if the bidder raised its offer. See id. at 1016.
126. See id. at 1014, 1015-16. The court concluded that the timing of the offer repre-
sented a threat to the shareholders given the increased earnings and potential of the cor-
poration. Id. at 1014.
127. See id. at 1015. The court found that there was a threat to the corporation itself
and to other constituencies (customers, suppliers, employees) because of the high level of
debt contemplated in the offer. See id.; see also infra note 130. The court also concluded
that the offer represented a threat because of the complexity and possibly misleading
nature of the financing arrangement. See Universal Foods, 708 F. Supp. at 1015.
128. See id. at 1015-16. The court in Universal Foods recognized that shareholder
choice is not mandated when there is a valid threat to shareholders. See id. Courts have
approved defensive measures which preclude shareholder choice when offer represents
threat to corporation and shareholders. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) (upheld dividend distribution and standstill
agreement as part of defensive plan to defeat tender offer); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958-59 (Del. 1985) (upheld company's self-tender, which ex-
cluded bidder, to defeat tender offer).
Critics, however, argue that the rights plan improperly alters the governing structure
of the corporation because it allows the board to preclude shareholder choice. See Note,
supra note 86, at 1005-06; Note, supra note 4, at 189-90. Moran, however, rejected the
argument that the rights plan significantly changes the corporate structure because of the
board's ability to redeem the rights plan and its fiduciary obligations. See Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985).
129. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1014-
15 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989). The court stated:
Applying the Unocal standards, I am unable to conclude that a board may in all
instances preclude shareholder choice solely on the basis of its own perception
of the inadequacy of the offer. If no other threat is posed to the corporation and
shareholders, a board must at some point allow shareholders to choose between
the offer and some alternative. Whether the alternative is to remain independ-
ent and reap the future benefits with the company.., or a financial restructur-
ing ... or an auction.., the shareholders must at some point be allowed to
choose.
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gave directors more latitude in rejecting inadequate tender offers. First,
the court adopted the view that threats to corporate viability are signifi-
cant in considering a tender offer. 130 Second, the court recognized that a
board does not have to auction itself to the first bidder, especially when
shareholders are just beginning to benefit from the company's improving
financial position. 3 '
The view that a board should not reject a tender offer solely because of
price inadequacy is consistent with the the Efficient Capital Market Hy-
pothesis ("ECMH"). 132 The ECMH contends that the stock market ac-
curately reflects a company's value, and therefore any offer above
prevailing market value is adequate by definition.133 In reality, however,
130. See id. at 1015. In Universal Foods, the court found the highly leveraged nature
of the offer and its effect on the long-term viability of the corporation, its customers,
suppliers and employees to be a valid corporate issue, worthy of board consideration. See
id. One commentator states that if a board may consider the interests of the corporate
enterprise, particularly its long-term viability after the completion of the tender offer, it is
easier to justify the board's power to preclude shareholder choice. See McBride, supra
note 116, at S14, col. 2. The author notes that Interco and Pillsbury addressed the issue
of enterprise interests in conflicting ways. Interco indicated that in an all-cash, all-shares
offer the primary threat is to shareholder interests, not enterprise interests. See City Cap-
ital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also TW Services, Inc.
v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,334, at 92,179
(Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (long run interests of shareholders and other corporate constitu-
encies not relevant in all-cash, all-shares tender offer situation because shareholders will
be completely bought out). It is unclear, however, whether Pillsbury rejected the use of
enterprise interests to evaluate a threat in all-cash, all-shares offers or simply found that
none existed in that particular case. See McBride, supra note 116, at S14, col. 3.
131. See Universal Foods, 708 F. Supp. at 1013.
132. See Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 269-70. The ECMH holds that competition
between sophisticated investors enables the stock market to reflect the fundamental value
of the businesses and assets underlying the stocks traded on the market. See id. Accord-
ing to the ECMH, the market is information efficient in that "[a]ll relevant publicly avail-
able information is analyzed by thousands of investors and any new data.., is quickly
noticed, digested and then incorporated in the price of the stock." Id. Because stock
prices would reflect all currently available information, investors would be wasting their
time by trying to beat the market through careful stock selection. See id.
Tender offers are considered a useful device in an efficient market because corporate
performance is mirrored in stock prices and management has an incentive to be efficient.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1165-74; Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1978). Moreover, the combination of an efficient market and tender
offers creates "a market for corporate control" because it constrains managerial ineffi-
ciency, self-dealing and reduces agency costs. See Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965). Thus, defensive measures, such as the
refusal to redeem a rights plan, which deprive shareholders of the opportunity to decide
on tender offers, are harmful to shareholders and contrary to traditional corporate gov-
erance theories. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1166; Gilson, supra note
79, at 845-48.
133. See Easterbrook & Fishel, supra note 18, at 1166-67; see also Andre, Tender Of-
fers for Corporate Control A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 12 Del. J. Corp.
L. 865, 871 (1987) (ECMH suggests impossibility of reaping profits by acquiring firms
whose stock is underpriced because no firm is worth more than its market price). Ac-
cording to the ECMH a bidder would offer a premium, and attempt a takeover, only if it
thought that it could profit by the takeover. If market prices conform closely to long run
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the market may not be perfectly efficient. Although the ECMH has been
accepted by some commentators,13 4 others have questioned whether the
market's pricing mechanism is always efficient. 135
The market may not consistently reflect a corporation's intrinsic
value, 136 and therefore a premium offer would not definitively establish
that the offer is adequate.1 37 Consequently, shareholders must be capable
of analyzing information about the company in order to decide whether
to accept an offer. Shareholders, however, are generally passive investors
and do not have the information or expertise to make a price adequacy
determination.13 1 On the other hand, the board is in the best position to
evaluate whether a premium offer is adequate. 139 The board is better
informed than the shareholders as to the company's worth, future pros-
pects and plans, and is more capable of determining whether the com-
pany should remain independent. 4° Moreover, the board is more
stock values, then the primary opportunity for profit would be those situations in which
the superior managerial skills of the acquiring firm could put the undermanaged re-
sources of the target to better use. See Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal
and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. Law & Econ. 371, 380-81 (1980). In
addition, potential synergy gains arising from the combination of two complementary
lines of businesses may lead to a takeover. See R. Clark, Corporate Law 535-36 (1986)
(Professor Clark, however, states that potential acquirers would resort to friendly merger
rather than tender offer); see also Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 274 n.103 (other factors
such as synergy gains do not account for the remarkable growth in takeover bids or the
character of particular targets).
134. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1165; Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 389-91 (1970); Fischel,
supra note 132, at 9; Gilson, supra note 79, at 838.
135. See Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 273-74. Professor Lowenstein states that
"whatever the market's long-run tendencies toward efficiency may be, they are only
that-tendencies. The market is not perfectly efficient for all stocks at all times." Id. at
274; see also S. Cottle, R. Murray & F. Block, supra note 109, at 23-27 (despite gains in
market efficiency, anomalies exist which challenge the accuracy of the market's pricing
mechanism); Summers, Does The Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?,
41 J. Fin. 591, 592 (1986) (existing evidence insufficient to establish that financial markets
are efficient in reflecting fundamental values). The stock market crash of 1987 also casts
doubt over the efficient market theory. See Farrell, The 'Efficient Market' was a Good
Idea-And Then Came the Crash, Bus. Wk., Feb. 22, 1988, at 140.
136. See supra note 109.
137. See Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 849-50 (D. Minn. 1986),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 875-76 (Del. 1985).
138. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
139. Indeed, in Van Gorkom the board was found liable for not informing itself of the
company's value before agreeing to a premium merger offer. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
at 875-76. Moreover, Delaware law has clearly recognized that the board's statutory
duty to manage the affairs of the corporation is fully applicable in the takeover context.
See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Rev-
lon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
140. See Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 Case W. Res.
882, 891 (1978); see also Yablon, supra note 91, at 88 (recognizing board's unique insights
into company's future prospects).
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sensitive to the likelihood that the bidder is seeking to acquire control of
the company at the cheapest possible price."' Thus, the decision to ac-
cept or reject a tender offer must be made by the board . 42
B. The Coercive Effects of All-Cash, All-Shares Tender Offers
Both the Interco and Pillsbury courts concluded that an all-cash, all-
shares tender offer is noncoercive143 Under this view, even if the target
board reasonably considers the offer inadequate, shareholders are not at
141. See Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 274-75 (takeover game is uneven, stock market
produces a number of attractively priced takeover candidates, and bidder, focusing on
intrinsic value, is looking more towards value of resources than to expected changes in
stock prices); see also Shipman, The Case for Reasonable State Regulation of Corporate
Takeovers: Some Observations Concerning the Ohio Experience, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 507,
508, 537 (1988) (hostile offerors naturally wish to stampede shareholders into selling
shares quickly and at cheapest possible price); O'Connell, supra note 6, at 38, col. 1
(board must review offers because prospective acquirers attempt to gain control as inex-
pensively as possible).
142. Some commentators, however, argue that undervalued stocks can remain under-
valued. Thus, shareholders may not mind being exploited by an inadequate offer because
of the attractiveness of a premium offer. See Andre, supra note 133, at 872; Coffee, Regu-
lating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role
in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1172-73 (1984). These commentators,
however, do not address whether bidders would start lowering their bids if they knew
management could not reject their offer.
The Kraft takeover is a recent example of how bidders can sometimes make what is
considered to be a very generous offer, but not necessarily their best offer. Kraft's board
initially characterized Philip Morris's hostile tender offer as inadequate, even though
Philip Morris offered a 50 percent premium over the prevailing market price. See Freed-
man & Gibson, Philip Morris Cos. Is Bidding $90 a Share For Kraft Inc. in $11 Billion
Tender Offer, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1988, at A3, col. 3. Kraft used its rights plan to resist
the offer and proposed an alternative transaction to its shareholders. Philip Morris even-
tually raised its initial bid to $106.00 per share and won the takeover battle. See Freed-
man & Gibson, Kraft Accepts Philip Morris's Sweetened Offer Totalling $13.1 Billion, or
$106.00 a Share in Cash, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1988, at A3, col. 1. Thus, despite making a
generous offer, Philip Morris felt the deal was still attractive at a price 18 percent higher
than its original offer. Kraft's shareholders were certainly better off, but it is uncertain
whether Philip Morris would have increased its bid if it knew that Kraft could not reject
the offer.
The Kraft takeover also shows that bidders do not always make tender offers because
target management is inefficient. Kraft was viewed as a company on the rise and not the
victim of poor management. See Dreyfack, Kraft, Minus Some Extra Baggage, Is Picking
up Speed, Bus. Wk., Mar. 9, 1987, at 74; see also Freedman & Gibson, Philip Morris Cos.
Is Bidding $90 a Share For Kraft Inc. in $11 Billion Tender Offer, supra, at A3, col. 3
(Philip Morris does not intend to replace Kraft's management). Kraft was taken over
because it was in excellent financial condition and was a well-established, successful com-
pany. Examples such as Kraft rebut the argument that tender offers are needed to pre-
vent the entrenchment of poor management and lend more support to the contention that
bidders are in pursuit of a bargain.
143. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. The Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1060 (Del. Ch.
1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also
Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988) ("Takeover
bids found to be a threat have typically involved a coercively structured proposal, such as
a two tiered, hostile tender offer."). But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986) (upheld rights plan as reasonable defensive
measure to counter grossly inadequate all-cash, all-shares offer).
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risk because they cannot be forced into accepting the offer. 1" This rea-
soning, however, ignores the argument that all tender offers are some-
what coercive and do not provide for free shareholder choice. 145 Neither
Interco nor Pillsbury considered whether the shareholders tendering into
the offers did so because they deemed the offers adequate, or because they
succumbed to the pressure to tender present in all tender offers.
Some commentators have noted that the prisoner's dilemma is not lim-
ited to two-tiered or partial tender offers, but includes all tender offers,
even all-cash, all-shares offers. 14 6 The prisoner's dilemma occurs because
no one shareholder can be sure how other shareholders will act, and
must assume that the offer will be successful.14 7 The pressure to tender
stems from the fear of ending up with minority shares that will generate
less value than if the shareholder had tendered to the original offer. 148
Target shareholders, therefore, are pressured into tendering their shares
even if they view the offered acquisition price as lower than the value of
the target in long-term perspective.' 49 Thus, allowing only shareholders
to determine the adequacy of an offer will invariably lead to acceptance
of the offer because of the coercive effects inherent in all tender offers.
Moreover, a promise of a second step at the same consideration does
not alleviate the pressure to tender. 150 There is no guarantee that a sec-
144. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 797-98.
145. See Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
146. See Bebehuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12
Del. J. Corp. L. 911, 926-27 (1987); Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 307; see also L. Solo-
mon, D. Schwartz & J. Bauman, supra note 7, at 1057 (recognizing that all tender offers
have second step which may lead to coercion); Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of
Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 679-81 (1984)
(all tender offers are coercive to some extent); Lipton, supra note 18, at 113 (misleading to
speak of free shareholder choice, as special dynamics of tender offer is such that share-
holders will always tender); Note, Poison Pill Rights: Toward a Two-Step Analysis of Di-
rectors'Fidelity to their Fiduciary Duties, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 373, 378 (1988) (tender
offer contains an inherent element of coercion).
147. See Bebchuk, supra note 146, at 926; Lipton, supra note 18, at 113-14; see also
Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 307 (shareholders pursue a high premium, but cannot com-
municate with each other or negotiate for better terms).
148. See Bebchuk, supra note 146, at 926. Professor Bebchuk states:
The pressure to tender is rooted in the consequences that the shareholder might
suffer if he does not tender. Clearly, the assurance that the shareholder will not
end up with any minority shares if he does tender in no way alleviates his fear
that he will end up with low-value minority shares if he does not tender. As
long as the expected value of minority shares is lower than the bid price, this
fear introduces a pressure to tender. This low expected value of minority
shares, which arises from the powers that a successful bidder would have upon
gaining control, does not depend on whether the successful bidder's offer was
partial or for all shares.
Id.
149. See Bebchuk, supra note 146, at 926; Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 307.
150. It is probable that some shareholders will not tender their shares. In order to
avoid having the offer termed coercive, bidders usually state that if the offer succeeds
there will be a prompt follow-up merger to merge out the non-tendering shareholders for
the same consideration and terms offered in the first-step. Therefore, non-tendering
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ond step will occur because the bidder may be unwilling or unable to
effect the promised second step. For example, the bidder's offer often
contains an escape clause which might release it from the second step it
promises to take if all shares are not tendered.15 1 Or a recurrence of
"black Monday" might make it impossible for the bidder to finance the
second step. In any event, even if the second step occurs, it occurs in the
future, and therefore a rational shareholder would always tender because
it is better to receive cash sooner rather than later.152 Consequently,
shareholders are forced into tendering, even in an all-cash, all-shares of-
fer with a promised second step, because there are still risks and disad-
vantages facing shareholders who do not tender in the first step. 153
C. The End-Stage Concept
Interco adhered to the view that the board's duty to redeem the rights
plan arises at the end-stage of the takeover contest. 154 The end-stage oc-
curs when the rights plan is no longer being used as negotiating leverage
or to improve or increase the options available to the target.1 5  The ad-
vent of the end-stage is usually signaled when the target has formulated
and proposed an alternative transaction.1 56
shareholders will not remain minority shareholders for an indefinite term. See City Capi-
tal Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988).
151. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060. Offers typically contain an escape clause which
gives the bidder the right to change the terms or amount of consideration in the event
economic or market conditions change. See, e.g., Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp.,
686 F. Supp. 1289, 1299 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Appellants' Opening Brief at 25, City Capital
Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (No. 10105) ("City Capital states in
its Offer to Purchase that even if the tender offer is consummated there may be circum-
stances in which 'the Purchaser does not consummate a merger or other business
combination.' ").
152. See Lowenstein, supra note 81, at 307; see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1339, 1342 (Del. 1987) (court considered an offer coercive
despite a promise of a second step for the same consideration offered in the first step).
153. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1013
(E.D. Wis.), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989).
The Pillsbury court agreed that there may be coercion or risk to the minority who do
not tender, but did not think that it was serious enough to deprive the majority of share-
holders of the right to accept the offer. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060. The court noted
that there were safeguards that protect against this risk: (1) every shareholder who ten-
dered may have withdrawn any time before the offer closed; (2) the offer did not close
until after the opinion was rendered so those who did not tender still had the opportunity
to tender; and (3) the bidder was required to use its best efforts to buy on the same terms
every share of Pillsbury stock held by non-tendering shareholders. See id. The court in
Universal Foods may have found the escape clause more significant because a majority of
the shareholders had not tendered into the offer. See Universal Foods, 708 F. Supp. at
1014.
154. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988).
155. See id.; see also Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, Inc., 686 F.
Supp. 595, 603 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (noting that target board was no longer attempting to use
poison pill to increase stock price, but not explicitly referring to end-stage).
156. The typical alternative transaction proposed by a target board is recapitalization.
The recapitalization often takes the form of a special dividend which is distributed to
stockholders in the form of cash and/or securities and is often financed by the sale of
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In Interco, the court found that the rights plan was being used solely to
prevent the target's shareholders from choosing between the tender offer
and the target's alternative restructuring plan which the court treated as
if it were a competing tender offer or other sale type alternative.1 57 The
existence of an alternative restructuring plan, however, should not be de-
terminative in deciding whether to order the board to redeem the rights
plan. 158 Although an alternative recapitalization may be viewed as com-
peting with a hostile tender offer, it is not, by its nature, a tender offer.
Unlike a tender offer, a recapitalization leaves shareholders with a con-
tinuing equity interest in the company and allows shareholders to partici-
pate in the future economic growth of the company.1 59 A restructuring
is intended to keep the target independent based on the board's conclu-
sion that the tender offer is inadequate and inferior to the target's short-
term or long-term potential.1 60 The proposal of an alternative recapitali-
zation, therefore, should not automatically call for redemption of the
rights plan because a recapitalization is not a sale of the company.
The end-stage concept or a legal rule requiring shareholder choice
when an all-cash, all-shares tender offer is made may further the goals of
shareholder democracy,1 61 but is beneficial to shareholders only if the
bidder has made an adequate tender offer. Ordering a board to redeem
rights and allowing shareholder choice when the target board has con-
certain assets. Shareholders also retain their existing shares which are referred to as
"stub" shares. These shares trade at a lower value than the pre-recapitalization shares
because their value reflects the distribution of the special dividend and is based on the
earnings of a smaller company. See British Printing & Communication Corp. v. Har-
court Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1519, 1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Interco, 551
A.2d at 793-94; AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 108-
09 (Del. Ch. 1986).
157. See Interco, 551 A.2d at 798.
158. In any event, courts have permitted a target board to implement a recapitalization
plan without shareholder approval when the board in good faith believes that the restruc-
turing will generate greater value for shareholders. See Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Part-
ners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 846 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414(8th Cir. 1987). Courts, however, have enjoined an alternative transaction when the hos-
tile tender offer has not been declared inadequate by the target board. See AC Acquisi-
tions, 519 A.2d at 106-07 (enjoining recapitalization as unreasonable response to adequate
tender offer because it precluded shareholders from deciding on a fair offer); see also
Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1244 (Del. Ch. 1988) (cannot force
shareholders to accept economically inferior transaction while, at the same time, preclude
them from considering economically superior one).
159. See Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 664 F. Supp. at 1525; Gelco, 652 F. Supp. at 846;
ACAcquisitions, 519 A.2d at 109.
160. See id. at 850; see also BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 475 (D. Del.
1988) (indicating that court may not interfere with recapitalization if proposed).
161. The end-stage concept does not preclude the target's shareholders from choosing
to accept premium tender offers or prevent bidders from saving shareholders from de-
pressed stock prices. See Coffee, supra note 142, at 1172. In addition, the end-stage
concept recognizes that a tender offer clearly benefits shareholders financially by offering
them a premium. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 n.9 (1982) (in enacting the
Williams Act, Congress did not want to deny shareholders opportunity to sell shares for
premium over market price).
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cluded that an all-cash, all-shares offer is inadequate is harmful to
shareholders.
A rights plan is effective because it gives the board bargaining leverage
in allowing it to reject inadequate or unfair takeovers.162 The end-stage
approach, however, takes away the board's negotiating leverage. It is
questionable whether a bidder will offer shareholders intrinsic value or its
best offer if it knows that the board will eventually be ordered to redeem
the rights plan.163 The end-stage approach, therefore, may prevent
shareholders from receiving the best possible price for their shares. 164
III. THE PROPER COURSE OF CONDUCT
A board should not be required to redeem its rights plan if it has rea-
sonably concluded that an all-cash, all-shares tender offer is inadequate.
Courts should not overturn a board's decision not to redeem rights unless
it acts in bad faith or is not well informed in determining that the offer is
inadequate. Some commentators have argued, however, that a board is
incapable of acting impartial and can effectively "paper" a transaction to
give it the appearance that it is exercising due care in determining inade-
quacy.1 65 Consequently, courts should pay considerably more attention
to the procedures followed by a board, particularly the outside directors,
162. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Del. 1985); see also
Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1296 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (pill does
not preclude all takeovers, only inadequate or unfair ones); Dawson, Pence & Stone,
supra note 29, at 426 ("poison pills may effectively deter certain inadequate or otherwise
undesirable offers").
163. The end-stage approach places the bidder in command because it alone will deter-
mine when to stop bidding. The bidder, however, will have no incentive to increase its
offer if it knows it just has to wait out the target's board. See Herzel, Schmidt & Davis,
Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 Corp. L. Rev. 107, 110
(1980) (legal rules requiring board to accept proposed merger would remove a significant
element of board's bargaining power); see also Yablon, supra note 91, at 90 (suggesting
lack of precise legal standards governing redemption may encourage bidders to increase
offers).
164. Recently, a study was conducted to determine whether shareholders receive
higher takeover premiums when their company has a rights plan. The study concluded
that companies protected by a rights plan received takeover premiums 69 percent greater
than those received by companies without a rights plan. See Georgeson & Company Inc.,
Poison Pill Impact Study 1-2 (Mar. 31, 1988). This report, however, was criticized be-
cause it did not sufficiently consider whether rights plans prevented some takeovers from
occurring. See id. Georgeson & Company, Inc. conducted another study to refute the
criticism. This study, designed to examine the actual impact of poison pills, concluded
that companies with rights plans still outperformed, in terms of the premiums received,
companies without rights plans by 9.6 percent. See Georgeson & Company Inc., Poison
Pill Impact Study II 6 (Oct. 31, 1988). Moreover, it found that companies with rights
plans were more likely to receive hostile bids. See id. at 7. The study was criticized again
when another research firm did its own study and concluded that performance was the
same between companies with and without rights plans. See Cowan, Study Asserts
'Poison Pills' Do Not Raise Stock Prices, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1988, at D4, col. 3.
165. See Note, supra note 146, at 397; Note, supra note 67, at 1330; see also City
Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 792-93 (Del. Ch. 1988) (expressing concern
over board's valuations and reliance on investment banker's opinion).
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in concluding that an offer is inadequate.166 Although this view does not
represent a significant change from existing law, it does propose that
courts refrain from rubber-stamping boards' inadequacy deter-
minations. 167
Courts are not equipped to make the actual financial decision that an
offer is inadequate, 168 but they may look at the board's methodology in
concluding that a given price is inadequate. 169 Particularly, courts
should examine the independence and thoroughness of the target's in-
vestment bankers and whether the target's outside directors played a sig-
nificant role in evaluating the offer's merits. 170 Courts should defer to
the board's decision to remain independent as long as the conclusion was
made under proper circumstances.' 7'
166. See Block & Hoff, The Duties of Boards to Redeem Poison Pills, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15,
1988, at 6, col. 3 (suggests courts may "require the board to make a more particularized
showing to justify its determination of financial inadequacy").
167. Professors Gilson and Kraakman, however, recently proposed that in addition to
examining certain board procedures, a court should exercise its own independent judg-
ment when determining whether a tender offer represents a threat to shareholders. See
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 61, at 270-74.
168. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27 (1979); see also Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal
for Reform, 36 Hastings L.J. 377, 394-96 (1985) (courts reluctant to apply intrinsic fair-
ness standard because it requires courts to make investment decision involving fundamen-
tal security analysis and involves considerations which business judgment rule was
created to avoid). But see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981)
(court should apply own independent business judgment in determining whether motion
to dismiss derivative suit should be granted); McBride, supra note 116, at S14, col. 2
(Pillsbury court made own determination that tender offer was adequate).
169. See Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1299 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 475-76 (D. Del. 1988); Anaconda Co. v.
Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627
(Del. 1984). Moreover, courts have not always been reluctant to find that a board acted
haphazardly in tender offer situations. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisi-
tion, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law) (court found
that board breached its duty of care in approving lock-up option, stating that where
board's" 'methodologies and procedures' are 'so restricted in scope, so shallow in execu-
tion, or otherwise so pro forma or halfhearted as to constitute a pretext or sham,' then
inquiry into their acts is not shielded by the business judgment rule") (quoting Auerbach
v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 634, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 929 (1979)).
170. Courts have just recently begun criticizing investment bankers for their actions
during takeover contests. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc., [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,071 (Del. Ch.), rev'd, [Current Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,401 (Del. May 3, 1989); see also Bartlett, Delaware Courts
Get Tough Toward Investment Bankers, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at D1, col. 1.
171. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1339 & n.12.
(Del. 1987); see also BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 475 (D. Del. 1988)
(board rejected offer only after conducting serious review of several relevant factors, in-
cluding: (i) the board's assessment of the value of the company; and (ii) the advice of its
investment banker); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 849 (D. Minn.
1986) (board devoted a five and one half hour meeting to evaluate the merits of offer and
acted to reject offer, based partly on advice from investment banker), aff'd in part, va-
cated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp.
1210, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reviewing report of company's investment banker and con-
cluding that business man could make a proper business judgment based upon report to
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Despite the view that an investment banker's opinion is not always
necessary, a board should obtain an independent investment banker's
opinion in determining whether a tender offer is adequate.172 Although
there is some possibility of self-serving opinions, the bankers do have
their professional reputations to consider and, therefore, arguably pro-
vide a necessary monitoring function. 173 In any event, courts are capable
of determining when to give less credence to inadequacy opinions. Opin-
ions by bankers that frequently and inexplicably change a company's
fairness range during the course of a takeover battle or who have a clear
conflict of interest should be discounted. 174
A board's decision to reject a tender offer because of price inadequacy
can be given more weight if it is the decision of a majority of outside
independent directors. 175 Outside directors are capable of protecting
shareholder interests when they truly remain independent. 176  The
board's decision to remain independent should be respected if the outside
directors distanced themselves from the management directors and re-
viewed the offer in a neutral manner. 177 Moreover, courts should recog-
nize that directors, even inside directors, have an incentive to consider a
tender offer objectively. A board that rejects an obviously adequate
reject offer); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 94,179, at 91,634 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988) (finding it signifi-
cant that company retained two independent outside investment bankers who concluded
offer was inadequate).
172. A valuation opinion by an investment adviser is not required as a matter of law.
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985); see also Amanda Acquisition
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1013 (E.D. Wis.) (not requiring invest-
ment banker's opinion because board was well-informed concerning the company's
value), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, boards invari-
ably obtain adequacy opinions since they are counseled by their attorneys to do so and
courts seem to expect them. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781
F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir. 1986); Lipton, supra note 18, at 101.
173. See Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 99, at 470; see also Note, Investment Bank-
ers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96 Yale L.J. 119, 126 (1986)
(although investment bankers may have incentive to craft opinions favorable to manage-
ment, they are outsiders with reputations beyond the client firm and are more difficult to
corrupt than inside managers).
174. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 792-93 (Del. Ch. 1988);
Bartlett, supra note 171, at D2, col. 4; see also Bebchuk & Kahan, Fairness Opinions:
How Fair are They and What Can be Done About it?, 1989 Duke L.J. 27, 49-53 (1989)
(suggesting that courts scrutinize bankers' opinions when conflict of interest exists).
175. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985);
Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1010-11 (E.D.
Wis.), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Gelfond & Sebastian,
supra note 98, at 468-69 (board may follow recommendation of truly independent direc-
tors); Shipman, supra note 141, at 537 (if disinterested outside directors carefully follow
proper methodology, there should be judicial deference).
176. See Universal Foods, 708 F. Supp. at 1010-11; see also Dobrzynski, Taking
Charge, Bus. Wk., July 3, 1989, at 66 (discussing positive shift in board's concern for
shareholders).
177. See Universal Foods, 708 F. Supp. at 1010-11 (finding it significant that ten in-
dependent directors on target's thirteen member board avoided contact with inside man-
agement when evaluating offer and clearly did not rubber-stamp management's position).
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tender offer will not remain in office for long if the company's stock price
falls and remains at its pre-offer level.17 Either other bidders will sur-
face and threaten the company's independence or shareholders will use
the powers of corporate democracy to vote the board out. 179
CONCLUSION
A board should be able to refuse to redeem a rights plan if, in good
faith and after reasonable investigation, it concludes that the offer is inad-
equate. The board has the duty to protect shareholders from harm and
an inadequate all-cash, all-shares offer represents such harm. A rights
plan forces bidders to offer shareholders full value for their shares. If the
board is forced, however, to redeem a rights plan at the end-stage of a
takeover contest, then the shareholders' chances of receiving full value
will be jeopardized. Thus, instead, courts should focus on the board's
inadequacy determination. The courts should not make their own in-
dependent conclusions concerning adequacy, but can examine the
board's methodology to ensure that the board had a reasonable basis for
its decision.
Anthony Augliera
178. See Cohen, supra note 6, at B5, col. 1 (board runs risk of losing proxy fight or
shareholder suits if their rejection decision based on price is not vindicated by markets).
179. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 959; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
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